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Abstract
Adversarial attack has cast a shadow on the
massive success of deep neural networks.
Despite being almost visually identical to
the clean data, the adversarial images can
fool deep neural networks into wrong pre-
dictions with very high confidence. In this
paper, however, we show that we can build
a simple binary classifier separating the ad-
versarial apart from the clean data with ac-
curacy over 99%. We also empirically show
that the binary classifier is robust to a second-
round adversarial attack. In other words, it
is difficult to disguise adversarial samples
to bypass the binary classifier. Further more,
we empirically investigate the generalization
limitation which lingers on all current defen-
sive methods, including the binary classifier
approach. And we hypothesize that this is
the result of intrinsic property of adversarial
crafting algorithms.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have been successfully adopted
to many life critical areas, e.g., skin cancer detection
(Esteva et al., 2017), auto-driving (Santana & Hotz,
2016), traffic sign classification (Cires¸An et al., 2012),
etc. A recent study (Szegedy et al., 2013), however,
discovered that deep neural networks are susceptible
to adversarial images. Figure 1 shows an example
of adversarial images generated via fast gradient sign
method (Kurakin et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016) on
MNIST. As we can see that although the adversarial
and original clean images are almost identical from the
perspective of human beings, the deep neural network
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will produce wrong predictions with very high confi-
dence. Similar techniques can easily fool the image
system into mistaking a stop sign for a yield sign, a
dog for a automobile, for example. When leveraged by
malicious users, these adversarial images pose a great
threat to the deep neural network systems.
Although adversarial and clean images appear visually
indiscernible, their subtle differences can successfully
fool the deep neural networks. This means that deep
neural networks are sensitive to these subtle differ-
ences. So an intuitively question to ask is: can we lever-
age these subtle differences to distinguish between ad-
versarial and clean images? Our experiment suggests
the answer is positive. In this paper we demonstrate
that a simple binary classifier can separate the adver-
sarial from the original clean images with very high ac-
curacy (over 99%). However, we also show that the bi-
nary classifier approach suffers from the generalization
limitation, i.e., it is sensitive 1) to a hyper-parameter
used in crafting adversarial dataset, and 2) to differ-
ent adversarial crafting algorithms. In addition to that,
we also discovered that this limitation is also shared
among other proposed methods against adversarial at-
tacking, e.g., defensive retraining (Huang et al., 2015;
Kurakin et al., 2016), knowledge distillation (Papernot
et al., 2015b), etc. We empirically investigate the limi-
tation and propose the hypothesis that the adversarial
and original dataset are, in effect, two completely dif-
ferent datasets, despite being visually similar.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
give an overview of the current research in adversarial
attack and defense, with a focus on deep neural net-
works. Then, it is followed by a brief summary of the
state-of-the-art adversarial crafting algorithms in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 presents our experiment results and
detailed discussions. And we conclude in Section 5.
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Figure 1. The adversarial images (second row) are generated from the first row via iterative FGSM. The label of each image is shown
below with prediction probability in parenthesis. Our model achieves less then 1% error rate on the clean data.
2. Related Work
The adversarial image attack on deep neural networks
was first investigated in (Szegedy et al., 2013). The au-
thors discovered that when added some imperceptible
carefully chosen noise, an image may be wrongly clas-
sified with high confidence by a well-trained deep neu-
ral network. They also proposed an adversarial craft-
ing algorithm based on optimization. We will briefly
summarize it in section 3. They also proposed the hy-
pothesis that the adversarial samples exist as a result of
the high nonlinearity of deep neural network models.
However, (Goodfellow et al., 2014) proposed a
counter-intuitive hypothesis explaining the cause of
adversarial samples. They argued that adversarial sam-
ples are caused by the models being too linear, rather
than nonlinear. They proposed two adversarial craft-
ing algorithms based on this hypothesis, i.e., fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) and least-likely class method
(LLCM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The least-likely
class method is later generalized to target class gradi-
ent sign method (TGSM) in (Kurakin et al., 2016).
(Papernot et al., 2015a) proposed another gradi-
ent based adversarial algorithm, the Jacobian-based
saliency map approach (JSMA) which can success-
fully alter the label of an image to any desired cate-
gory.
The adversarial images have been shown to be trans-
ferable among deep neural networks (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Kurakin et al., 2016). This poses a great threat
to current learning systems in that the attacker needs
not the knowledge of the target system. Instead, the
attacker can train a different model to create adversar-
ial samples which are still effective for the target deep
neural networks. What’s worse, (Papernot et al., 2016)
has shown that adversarial samples are even transfer-
able among different machine learning techniques, e.g.,
deep neural networks, support vector machine, deci-
sion tree, logistic regression, etc.
Small steps have been made towards the defense
of adversarial images. (Kurakin et al., 2016) shows
that some image transformations, e.g., Gaussian noise,
Gaussian filter, JPEG compression, etc., can effectively
recover over 80% of the adversarial images. However,
in our experiment, the image transformation defense
does not perform well on images with low resolution,
e.g., MNIST. Knowledge distillation is also shown to
be an effective method against most adversarial im-
ages (Papernot et al., 2015b). The restrictions of defen-
sive knowledge distillation are 1) that it only applies
to models that produce categorical probabilities, and
2) that it needs model retraining. Adversarial training
(Kurakin et al., 2016; Huang et al., 2015) was also
shown to greatly enhance the model robustness to ad-
versarials. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, defen-
sive distillation and adversarial training suffers from,
what we call, the generalization limitations. Our exper-
iment suggests this seems to be an intrinsic property
of adversarial datasets.
3. Crafting Adversarials
The are mainly two categories of algorithms to gener-
ate adversarial samples, model independent and model
dependent. We briefly summarize these two classes of
methods in this section.
Adversarial and Clean Data Are Not Twins
By conventions, we useX to represent input image set
(usually a 3-dimension tensor), and Y to represent the
label set, usually one-hot encoded. Lowercase repre-
sents an individual data sample, e.g., x for one input
image. Subscript to data samples denotes one of its
elements, e.g., xi denotes one pixel in the image, yi
denotes probability for the i-th target class. f denotes
the model, θ the model parameter, J the loss function.
We use the superscript adv to denote adversarial re-
lated variables, e.g., xadv for one adversarial image.
δx denotes the adversarial noise for one image, i.e.,
xadv = x+ δx. For clarity, we also include the model
used to craft the adversarial samples where necessary,
e.g., xadv(f1) denotes the adversarial samples created
with model f1. D denotes the image value domain, usu-
ally [0, 1] or [0, 255]. And  is a scalar controlling the
scale of the adversarial noise, another hyper-parameter
to choose.
3.1. Model Independent Method
A box-constrained minimization algorithm based on
L-BFGS was the first algorithm proposed to generate
adversarial data (Szegedy et al., 2013). Concretely we
want to find the smallest (in the sense of L2-norm)
noise δx such that the adversarial image belongs to a
different category, i.e., f(xadv) 6= f(x).
δx = argmin
r
c‖r‖∞ + J(x+ r, yadv)
s.t. x+ r ∈ D
(1)
3.2. Model Dependent Methods
There are mainly three methods that rely on model
gradient, i.e., fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Ku-
rakin et al., 2016), target class method (Kurakin et al.,
2016; Kurakin et al., 2016) (TGSM) and Jacobian-
based saliency map approach (JSMA) (Papernot et al.,
2015a). We will see in Section 4 that despite that they
all produce highly disguising adversarials, FGSM and
TGSM produce compatible adversarial datasets which
are complete different from adversarials generated via
JSMA.
FA S T G R A D I E N T S I G N M E T H O D ( F G S M )
FGSM tries to modify the input towards the direction
where J increases, i.e., dJ(x, yadv)
/
dx , as shown in
Equation 2.
δx =  sign
(
dJ(x, y)
dx
)
(2)
Originally (Kurakin et al., 2016) proposes to gener-
ate adversarial samples by using the true label i.e.,
yadv = ytrue, which has been shown to suffer from
the label leaking problem (Kurakin et al., 2016). In-
stead of true labels, (Kurakin et al., 2016) proposes
to use the predicted label, i.e., y = f(x), to generate
adversarial examples.
This method can also be used iteratively as shown in
Equation 3. Iterative FGSM has much higher success
rate than the one-step FGSM. However, the iterative
version is less robust to image transformation (Kurakin
et al., 2016).
xadvk+1 = x
adv
k +  sign
(
dJ(xadvk , yk)
dx
)
xadv0 = x
yk = f(x
adv
k )
(3)
TA R G E T C L A S S G R A D I E N T S I G N M E T H O D
( T G S M )
This method tries to modify the input towards the di-
rection where p(yadv | x) increases.
δx = − sign
(
dJ(x, yadv)
dx
)
(4)
Originally this method was proposed as the least-likely
class method (Kurakin et al., 2016) where yadv was
chosen as the least-likely class predicted by the model
as shown in Equation 5.
yadv = OneHotEncode (argmin f(x)) (5)
And it was extended to a more general case where yadv
could be any desired target class (Kurakin et al., 2016).
JA C O B I A N - B A S E D S A L I E N C Y M A P
A P P R O A C H ( J S M A )
Similar to the target class method, JSMA (Papernot
et al., 2015a) allows to specify the desired target class.
However, instead of adding noise to the whole input,
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Table 1. Accuracy on adversarial samples generated with FGSM/TGSM.
f1 f2
Dataset Xtest X
adv(f1)
test Xtest X
adv(f1)
test {Xtest}adv(f2) {Xadv(f1)test }adv(f2)
MNIST 0.9914 0.0213 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
CIFAR10 0.8279 0.1500 0.99 1.00 0.01 1.00
SVHN 0.9378 0.2453 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
JSMA changes only one pixel at a time. A saliency
score is calculated for each pixel and pixel with the
highest score is chosen to be perturbed.
s(xi) =
{
0 if st < 0 or so > 0
st|so| otherwise
st =
∂yt
∂xi
so =
∑
j 6=t
∂yj
∂xi
(6)
Concretely, st is the Jacobian value of the desired tar-
get class yt w.r.t an individual pixel, so is the sum
of Jacobian values of all non-target class. Intuitively,
saliency score indicates the sensitivity of each output
class w.r.t each individual pixel. And we want to per-
turb the pixel towards the direction where p(yt | x)
increases the most.
4. Experiment
Generally, we follow the steps below to test the ef-
fectiveness and limitation of the binary classifier ap-
proach.
1. Train a deep neural network f1 on the original
clean training data Xtrain, and craft adversarial
dataset from the original clean data, Xtrain →
X
adv(f1)
train , Xtest → Xadv(f1)test . f1 is used to gen-
erate the attacking adversarial dataset which we
want to filter out.
2. Train a binary classifier f2 on the combined (shuf-
fled) training data {Xtrain, Xadv(f1)train }, where
Xtrain is labeled 0 and X
adv(f1)
train labeled 1.
3. Test the accuracy of f2 on Xtest and X
adv(f1)
test ,
respectively.
4. Construct second-round adversarial test data,
{Xtest, Xadv(f1)test } → {Xtest, Xadv(f1)test }adv(f2)
and test f2 accuracy on this new adversarial
dataset. Concretely, we want to test whether we
could find adversarial samples 1) that can success-
fully bypass the binary classifier f2, and 2) that
can still fool the target model f1 if they bypass
the binary classifier. Since adversarial datasets
are shown to be transferable among different ma-
chine learning techniques (Papernot et al., 2016),
the binary classifier approach will be seriously
flawed if f2 failed this second-round attacking
test.
The code to reproduce our experiment are avail-
able https://github.com/gongzhitaao/
adversarial-classifier.
4.1. Efficiency and Robustness of the Classifier
We evaluate the binary classifier approach on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and SVHN datasets. Of all the datasets, the
binary classifier achieved accuracy over 99% and was
shown to be robust to a second-round adversarial at-
tack. The results are summarized in Table 1. Each col-
umn denotes the model accuracy on the corresponding
dataset. The direct conclusions from Table 1 are sum-
marized as follows.
1. Accuracy on Xtest and X
adv(f1)
test suggests that
the binary classifier is very effective at separat-
ing adversarial from clean dataset. Actually dur-
ing our experiment, the accuracy on Xtest is al-
ways near 1, while the accuracy on Xadv(f1)test is
either near 1 (successful) or near 0 (unsuccess-
ful). Which means that the classifier either suc-
cessfully detects the subtle difference completely
or fails completely. We did not observe any values
in between.
2. Accuracy on {Xadv(f1)test }adv(f2) suggests that we
were not successful in disguising adversarial
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samples to bypass the the classifier. In other
words, the binary classifier approach is robust to
a second-round adversarial attack.
3. Accuracy on {Xtest}adv(f2) suggests that in case
of the second-round attack, the binary classifier
has very high false negative. In other words, it
tends to recognize them all as adversarials. This,
does not pose a problem in our opinion. Since our
main focus is to block adversarial samples.
4.2. Generalization Limitation
Before we conclude too optimistic about the binary
classifier approach performance, however, we discover
that it suffers from the generalization limitation.
1. When trained to recognize adversarial dataset
generated via FGSM/TGSM, the binary classifier
is sensitive to the hyper-parameter .
2. The binary classifier is also sensitive to the adver-
sarial crafting algorithm.
In out experiment, the aforementioned limitations also
apply to adversarial training (Kurakin et al., 2016;
Huang et al., 2015) and defensive distillation (Paper-
not et al., 2015b).
S E N S I T I V I T Y T O 
Table 2 summarizes our tests on CIFAR10. For brevity,
we use f2
∣∣
=0
to denote that the classifier f2 is trained
on adversarial data generated on f1 with  = 0. The
binary classifier is trained on mixed clean data and
adversarial dataset which is generated via FGSM with
 = 0.03. Then we re-generate adversarial dataset via
FGSM/TGSM with different  values.
Table 2.  sensitivity on CIFAR10
f2
∣∣
=0.03
 Xtest X
adv(f1)
test
0.3 0.9996 1.0000
0.1 0.9996 1.0000
0.03 0.9996 0.9997
0.01 0.9996 0.0030
As shown in Table 2, f2
∣∣
=0
can correctly filter out ad-
versarial dataset generated with  ≥ 0, but fails when
adversarial data are generated with  < 1. Results on
MNIST and SVHN are similar. This phenomenon was
also observed in defensive retraining (Kurakin et al.,
2016). To overcome this issue, they proposed to use
mixed  values to generate the adversarial datasets.
However, Table 2 suggests that adversarial datasets
generated with smaller  are superset of those gen-
erated with larger . This hypothesis could be well
explained by the linearity hypothesis (Kurakin et al.,
2016; Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016). The same
conclusion also applies to adversarial training. In our
experiment, the results of defensive retraining are sim-
ilar to the binary classifier approach.
D I S PA R I T Y A M O N G A D V E R S A R I A L
S A M P L E S
In our experiment, we also discovered that the binary
classifier is also sensitive to the algorithms used to
generate the adversarial datasets.
Specifically, the binary classifier trained on FGSM ad-
versarial dataset achieves good accuracy (over 99%) on
FGSM adversarial dataset, but not on adversarial gen-
erated via JSMA, and vise versa. However, when bi-
nary classifier is trained on a mixed adversarial dataset
from FGSM and JSMA, it performs well (with accu-
racy over 99%) on both datasets. This suggests that
FGSM and JSMA generate adversarial datasets that
are far away from each other. It is too vague with-
out defining precisely what is being far away. In our
opinion, they are far away in the same way that CI-
FAR10 is far away from SVHN. A well-trained model
on CIFAR10 will perform poorly on SVHN, and vise
versa. However, a well-trained model on the the mixed
dataset of CIFAR10 and SVHN will perform just as
well, if not better, on both datasets, as if it is trained
solely on one dataset.
The adversarial datasets generated via FGSM and
TGSM are, however, compatible with each other. In
other words, the classifier trained on one adversarial
datasets performs well on adversarials from the other
algorithm. They are compatible in the same way that
training set and test set are compatible. Usually we ex-
pect a model, when properly trained, should generalize
well to the unseen data from the same distribution, e.g.,
the test dataset.
In effect, it is not just FGSM and JSMA are incompati-
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Figure 2. Adversarial training (Huang et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016) does not work. This is a church window plot (Warde-Farley &
Goodfellow, 2016). Each pixel (i, j) (row index and column index pair) represents a data point x˜ in the input space and x˜ = x+hj+vi,
where h is the direction computed by FGSM and v is a random direction orthogonal to h. The  ranges from [−0.5, 0.5] and (·) is the
interpolated value in between. The central black dot represents the original data point x, the orange dot (on the right of the center dot)
represents the last adversarial sample created from x via FGSM that is used in the adversarial training and the blue dot represents a
random adversarial sample created from x that cannot be recognized with adversarial training. The three digits below each image, from
left to right, are the data samples that correspond to the black dot, orange dot and blue dot, respectively. ( ) represents the data
samples that are always correctly (incorrectly) recognized by the model. represents the adversarial samples that can be correctly
recognized without adversarial training only. And represents the data points that were correctly recognized with adversarial training
only, i.e., the side effect of adversarial training.
ble. We can generate adversarial data samples by a lin-
ear combination of the direction computed by FGSM
and another random orthogonal direction, as illustrated
in a church plot (Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016)
Figure 2. Figure 2 visually shows the effect of adver-
sarial training (Kurakin et al., 2016). Each image rep-
resents adversarial samples generated from one data
sample, which is represented as a black dot in the cen-
ter of each image, the last adversarial sample used in
adversarial training is represented as an orange dot (on
the right of black dot, i.e., in the direction computed by
FGSM). The green area represents the adversarial sam-
ples that cannot be correctly recognized without adver-
sarial training but can be correctly recognized with
adversarial training. The red area represents data sam-
ples that can be correctly recognized without adver-
sarial training but cannot be correctly recognized with
adversarial training. In other words, it represents the
side effect of adversarial training, i.e., slightly reducing
the model accuracy. The white (gray) area represents
the data samples that are always correctly (incorrectly)
recognized with or without adversarial training.
As we can see from Figure 2, adversarial training does
make the model more robust against the adversarial
sample (and adversarial samples around it to some ex-
tent) used for training (green area). However, it does
not rule out all adversarials. There are still adversarial
samples (gray area) that are not affected by the adver-
sarial training. Further more, we could observe that
the green area largely distributes along the horizontal
direction, i.e., the FGSM direction. In (Nguyen et al.,
2014), they observed similar results for fooling images.
In their experiment, adversarial training with fooling
images, deep neural network models are more robust
against a limited set of fooling images. However they
can still be fooled by other fooling images easily.
5. Conclusion
We show in this paper that the binary classifier is a sim-
ple yet effective and robust way to separating adversar-
ial from the original clean images. Its advantage over
defensive retraining and distillation is that it serves as
a preprocessing step without assumptions about the
model it protects. Besides, it can be readily deployed
without any modification of the underlying systems.
However, as we empirically showed in the experiment,
the binary classifier approach, defensive retraining and
distillation all suffer from the generalization limitation.
For future work, we plan to extend our current work in
two directions. First, we want to investigate the dispar-
ity between different adversarial crafting methods and
its effect on the generated adversarial space. Second,
we will also carefully examine the cause of adversar-
ial samples since intuitively the linear hypothesis does
not seem right to us.
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